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Outsourcing and skill-specific employment in a small economy:
Austria after the fall of the Iron Curtain
Abstract
We set up a model, in which firms in a small industrialized country outsource part of their production to
a foreign economy, which is rich in low-skilled labour. We analyse, how a decline in trade costs affects
outsourcing activities and the production structure in the small economy. A stimulation of cross-border
outsourcing raises wage dispersion and, if labour markets are unionized, also the employment of
high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour. Using a panel of Austrian industries, we find, first, that
decreasing trade barriers - as observed after the fall of the Iron Curtain - indeed stimulate outsourcing to
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and, second, that outsourcing to these
countries significantly shifts relative employment in favour of high-skilled labour.
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1. Introduction 
Cross border outsourcing is an essential characteristics of the current wave of globalization. 
Recent studies point to an important role of outsourcing and trade in intermediate inputs for the 
explanation of rising wage differentials in the US. Feenstra and Hanson (2001, p. 1) stress that 
”trade in intermediate inputs can have an impact on wages and employment that is much greater 
than for trade in final consumer goods” and Krugman (1995, p. 331) remarks that ”it is hard to 
argue that the sheer volume of trade (...) marks a qualitative difference from previous 
experience”. Rather, it is the composition of trade in general and the share of intermediate goods 
in particular, which matters (Feenstra and Hanson, 2001, p. 5).  
Theoretical research on international outsourcing and its impact on factor prices predominantly 
builds upon traditional trade models. For an analysis in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework see 
Arndt (1997), Deardorff (2001), Egger (2002), Jones (2000), and Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 
2001). Kohler (2001) addresses the impact of outsourcing on the labour market in a specific 
factors model. The main finding is that the impact of international outsourcing on factor prices 
may be similar to the impact of sector-biased or factor-biased technological change, depending 
on the type of model used and the number of sectors engaged in international outsourcing (see the 
discussion in Egger and Falkinger, 2001).1 However, this literature does not consider 
imperfections in the factor markets, like the existence of institutions so that the results are less 
important for unionized European labour markets, where the employment effects of cross-border 
outsourcing should be especially pronounced.  
                                                     
1 For a discussion on whether it is the factor bias or the sector bias of technological change, 
which matters for the relative factor price adjustments, see Krugman (2000) and Leamer (1998). 
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Empirical research on the impact of outsourcing on labour markets mainly focuses on the United 
States. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997, 1999) construct a wide measure of cross-border 
outsourcing and identify a pronounced effect on the US labour market in terms of high-skilled 
relative to low-skilled wages. In contrast, Slaughter (2000) concentrates on outsourcing by 
multinational enterprises headquartered in the US and does not find a significant impact. For 
European economies empirical findings are rather scarce. Egger and Egger (2001) concentrate on 
factor intensity changes in response to an increase in the EU’s outward processing trade. Egger 
and Egger (2002) provide first insights into outsourcing induced factor price developments in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In Western European labour markets, employment effects of cross-
border outsourcing should be especially relevant, due to the high degree of unionization. 
However, to our knowledge, evidence is missing so far. 
We provide a theoretical model, in which firms in a small open economy (Home), which is a 
price-taker in the world market, may produce a homogeneous good either nationally, using low-
skilled and high-skilled labour at home, or by outsourcing (part of) their intermediate input 
production across borders, using low-skilled labour abroad and only high-skilled labour at home. 
Cross-border outsourcing therefore leads to intermediate goods imports of Home. We investigate, 
how a decline in trade barriers affects outsourcing of firms located in Home into a foreign low-
skilled labour rich economy (Foreign). We find that a stimulation of outsourcing activities raises 
the employment of high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour, if the market for low-skilled labour 
in Home is unionized.  
In the econometric analysis, we examine the impact of trade liberalization between Western 
Europe and Eastern economies (including countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union) observed after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In particular, we identify the effect of 
this trade liberalizing process on outsourcing activities and the related employment effects in 
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Austria. Thereby, Austria seems to be a natural candidate due to the geographical proximity and 
historic ties to the Eastern economies.2 In the manufacturing sector outsourcing to Eastern 
countries rose dramatically during the period 1990-1998. With an average annual increase of 
10.71%, it grew much faster than overall outsourcing (1.67% p.a.), exports (3.9% p.a.) or imports 
(2.8% p.a.).3 In the Austrian labour market, the ratio of high-skilled relative to low-skilled 
employment rose markedly, with an average annual growth rate of 4.43%. In contrast, the ratio of 
high-skilled relative to low-skilled wages was nearly constant over the same period with an 
average annual growth rate of 0.02%. This asymmetry in relative employment and relative wage 
dynamics may be explained by the high degree of unionization in Austrian labour markets, with 
the highest bargaining coverage rate of all EU members. 
We find our theoretical predictions to be widely in accordance with the empirical results for a 
panel of 20 manufacturing industries at the NACE 2-digit level. First, outsourcing to Eastern 
countries is low-wage seeking and stimulated by shrinking trade barriers. Second, an increase in 
outsourcing to the Eastern countries by 1% shifts relative employment by about 0.1% in favour of 
high-skilled labour. We apply two panel econometric approaches, instrumental variables (two-
stage least squares, 2SLS, see Krishnakumar, 1996) and systems estimation (three-stage least 
squares, 3SLS) techniques using a fixed (industry and time) effects estimator. According to our 
results, outsourcing has to be treated as an endogenous variable. Otherwise, there would be a 
downward bias of the outsourcing effects on relative employment.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model, Section 3 presents 
the empirical results. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. In the Appendix, details on 
the construction and data sources of variables are provided. 
                                                     
2 In 1997, Austria’s imports of manufactures from Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union relative to gross production were 2.5 times higher than the EU average (calculations 
are based on OECD Statistics on Foreign Trade). 
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2. Theoretical framework 
An industrialized economy ”Home”, endowed with H  units of high-skilled and L  units of low-
skilled labour, faces two potential trading partners, ”Foreign” and an unspecified Rest of the 
World (”RoW”).4 We assume that Home is small as compared to RoW and, in addition, that 
Home’s demand for low-skilled labour is low relative to Foreign’s low-skilled labour supply. 
Trade between Home and RoW is free, whereas tariffs and non-tariff barriers are an important 
impediment to trade between Foreign and Home as well as between Foreign and RoW. 
Competitive firms in Home employ high-skilled and low-skilled labour in the production of a 
single homogeneous final good X (the numéraire good). Markets for the two skill groups are 
segmented and both H and L are internationally immobile. Whereas high-skilled labour is 
supplied in a perfectly competitive labour market in Home, trade union activities may play an 
important role in determining both the employment level and the wage rate of low-skilled labour. 
In our theoretical analysis, we allow for unionized as well as competitive low-skilled labour 
markets and compare our findings for these two labour market regimes. Motivated by the 
empirical observation that relative wages are not fully flexible in a unionized economy (see e.g. 
Belman and Heywood, 1990; Meng, 1990; and Dell’ Aringa and Lucifora, 1994), we assume that 
the wage-setting curve, which represents the outcome of the wage determination process in a 
unionized labour market, gives a negative relationship between low-skilled labour employment 
and relative wages (measured as wages of high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour).5 Like in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Noteworthy, outsourcing to OECD countries increased only by 0.6% p.a. 
4 Home may be associated with Austria and Foreign represents Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. 
5 The idea is that unions attempt to reduce the spread between high-skilled and low-skilled wages 
and accept a higher wage dispersion only, if low-skilled labour employment declines, i.e., if 
unemployment of the low-skilled workers increases. 
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right-to-manage and monopoly union models, firms choose employment unilaterally so that low-
skilled labour is paid its marginal product.  
There are two technologies available in Home to produce the homogeneous final good X: an 
integrated production mode (i) and a fragmented one (f). Whereas integrated production, which is 
assumed to be organized within a single firm, is entirely located in Home and uses both low-
skilled and high-skilled labour supplied by Home, a fragmented firm produces only a down-
stream fragment in Home, while it imports an up-stream component from Foreign. Cross-border 
outsourcing is attractive, since low-skilled labour is cheaper in Foreign than it is in Home.6 For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume that differences in wage rates are too small to pay for 
outsourcing activities between Home and RoW so that outsourcing (for both Home and RoW) is 
only possible to Foreign. Thus, Home exports X and imports intermediate goods from Foreign. 
We assume that the imported intermediate good is produced by a foreign affiliate of a 
multinational enterprise located in Home. The down-stream process uses only high-skilled labour 
together with the imported fragment. In the production of the up-stream fragment, Foreign’s low-
skilled labour is employed. Moreover, some additional high-skilled labour supplied by Home is 
necessary to make Foreign’s intermediate good usable for Home.7 In sum, fragmented production 
(f) does not use Home-supplied low-skilled labour.  
In Section 2.1 we derive the equilibrium values for outsourcing activities, wages, and 
employment as functions of the economic fundamentals of Home, low-skilled wages in Foreign, 
and trade costs for intermediate inputs. Section 2.2 provides a comparative static analysis for the 
impact of a decline in trade costs on outsourcing, wages, and employment.  
                                                     
6 Grossman and Helpman (2002) stress the importance of imperfect contracting and search costs 
in the context of fragmentation. This issue is not considered here. 
7 Jones (2000, p. 117) stresses the importance of service links for cross-border outsourcing. ”The 
costs of service links include (...) costs of communication, and the costs of planning and the 
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2.1 Production technologies, profit maximization and outsourcing equilibrium 
The two production technologies are given by 
 ),( ikk
ii
k hlFX =  (1) 
 ),( djj
ff
j hoFX =  (2) 
where superscript i (f) indicates that the production of firm k (j) is integrated (fragmented). ikX  
and fjX  denote output. kl  is low-skilled labour from Home employed in firm k. 
i
kh  is high-
skilled labour from Home employed in integrated firm k. djh  is high-skilled labour from Home 
employed in the down-stream process of a fragmented firm j (d refers to the down-stream 
process). )(⋅iF  and )(⋅fF  are linearly homogeneous, strictly increasing, and strictly 
quasiconcave production functions. jo  is the intermediate input of firm j, produced in Foreign by 
an affiliate of multinational firm j under a Leontief technology 
 { }ˆmin , uj j jo l h= , (3) 
where ˆjl  denotes Foreign low-skilled labour used to produce the imported fragment jo . 
u
jh  units 
of high-skilled labour are necessary for coordination activities to make jo  units of Foreign’s 
intermediate good usable in the downstream process of a fragmented firm in Home. u indicates 
the up-stream process. This (Home-supplied) high-skilled labour, ujh , employed in the production 
of the up-stream fragment, cannot be substituted by Foreign-supplied low-skilled labour ˆjl . 
According to (1), (2) and (3), Home’s high-skilled labour can be employed either in an integrated 
                                                                                                                                                                           
coordination to match the quality and quantity of output flows”. In Burda and Dluhosch (2002), 
expenditures for business service activities determine the degree of fragmentation. 
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firm ( ih ), in the down-stream process of a fragmented firm ( dh ), or in the production of the 
imported intermediate good ( uh ). 
The decision problem of integrated firm k is given by 
 ikHkL
i
kk
i
hl
hwlwhlF
i
kk
−−),(max
,
, (4) 
where Lw  and Hw  denote wage rates of (Home-supplied) low-skilled and high-skilled labour, 
respectively. Individual firms take wages as given. The decision problem of outsourcing firm j is 
 ˆ
,
max ( , ) [ ( )]
d
j j
f d d
j j H j H jLo h
F o h w w t O o w hτ− + + + − . (5) 
Lˆw  denotes Foreign’s wage rate for low-skilled labour and t represents trade costs (tariff or non-
tariff barriers to trade). ∑
=
≡
J
j j
oO
1
 is Home’s aggregate outsourcing volume. )(Oτ  indicates 
the possibility of external diseconomies of scale and accounts for possible limitations of 
outsourcing. External diseconomies of scale may arise due to congestion at the border, rising 
prices for buildings and offices in Foreign, or other variable infrastructure costs. We assume 
0)0( =τ  and 0)( ≥′ Oτ . Two cases are considered: (i) for all O 0)( >′ Oτ , implying external 
diseconomies of scale and (ii) for all O 0)( =′ Oτ , where diseconomies of scale do not arise, since 
( ) 0Oτ =  holds for all O. 
We focus on interior solutions (i.e., 0>kl , 0>
i
kh , 0>jo  and 0>
d
jh ).
8 We denote the 
respective aggregate employment levels in integrated firms by L and iH , and the aggregate 
employment levels in fragmented firms by uH  and dH . Subscript notation is used for partial 
                                                     
8 This means that trade barriers t and low-skilled wages in Foreign Lˆw  are such that they allow 
for some outsourcing from Home into Foreign but not for full specialization in the fragmented 
production mode. 
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derivatives. Then, due to the linear homogeneity of the production functions, the first-order 
conditions for optimal factor inputs in integrated firms are 
 L
i
L wF =),1( κ  (6) 
 H
i
H wF i =),1( κ  (7) 
with LH i /≡κ . The first-order conditions for optimal input choice in fragmented firms are  
 )(ˆ),1( OwcvF H
f
O τ++=  (8) 
 H
f
H wvF d =),1(  (9) 
where OHv d /≡  and twc L +≡ ˆˆ . Since aggregate demand for high-skilled labour is given by 
dui HHH ++ , the aggregate resource constraint for high-skilled labour is 
 HOvL =++ )1(κ . (10) 
If relative wages are fully flexible, i.e., in the case of a competitive low-skilled labour market, 
equilibrium employment of low-skilled labour is given by 
 LL = . (11a) 
In contrast, in the presence of trade unions employment is a negative function of relative wages, 
i.e., 
 0)(),( <′= ωω LLL , (11b) 
with LH ww /≡ω . )(ωL  is the wage-setting curve that gives all possible ( ω,L )-combinations, 
which are consistent with the wage determination process in a unionized low-skilled labour 
market.9 
The system of the six equations (6)-(10) and (11a) or (11b) determines the equilibrium values of 
Lw , Hw , κ , v , L and O as functions of costs cˆ , technologies 
iF , fF , τ , high-skilled labour 
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endowment H , and low-skilled labour endowment L  in the case of a competitive low-skilled 
labour market or )(ωL  in the presence of unions. Note that zero-profit conditions 0=iπ  and 
0=fπ  are always fulfilled in equilibrium due to the linear homogeneity of iF  and fF . 
 
2.2 Comparative static analysis: A decline in trade barriers t 
How does a decline in trade barriers t (as observed in the period after the fall of the Iron Curtain) 
affect equilibrium values of outsourcing activities, relative wages and relative labour employment 
in Home? Note first, that equations (6) and (7) give the standard negative relationship )(ωκ , 
0)( <′ ωκ  (with inverse )(κω , 0)( <′ κω ), where /H Lw wω =  is the relative wage. Second, 
equations (7) and (9) establish a monotonous relationship )(κv , 0)( >′ κv  between skill-intensity 
κ in integrated production and skill-intensity ν in fragmented production. Third, using )(κv , 
0)( >′ κv , )(κω , 0)( <′ κω , implicit differentiation of resource constraint (10) gives a negative 
relationship )(κO , 0)( <′ κO  between outsourcing volume O and skill-intensity κ. (Note 
0)()(/ ≥′′= κωωκ LddL , since 0)( ≤′ ωL , according to (11a), (11b).) Finally, we substitute (9) 
for Hw  in (8) to obtain 
 ))((ˆ))(,1())(,1( κτκκ OcvFvF fH
f
O d +=− . (12) 
0≥fOH dF , 0<
f
HH ddF  and 0)( >′ κv  imply that the left-hand side of (12) increases with κ, 
whereas the right-hand side is non-increasing in κ because of 0)( ≥′ Oτ  and 0)( <′ κO . Thus, 
(12) determines a positive relationship )ˆ(cκ , 0)ˆ( >′ cκ . Note that all results so far are 
independent of the labour market regime, i.e., independent of whether the low-skilled labour 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 We assume that )(ωL  is such that an interior solution with both production technologies used in 
equilibrium is guaranteed. 
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market is competitive or unionized. Relationship )ˆ(cκ  allows us to derive the comparative static 
effects of a decline in trade barriers t. Since Home’s demand for low-skilled labour is assumed to 
be small with respect to the low-skilled labour supply in Foreign, Lˆw  is exogenous from Home’s 
point of view.10 Equations (10) and (12) determine the equilibrium values *κ  and *O . 
As a first result, we find that 0/* <dtdO . This is an immediate consequence of 0)ˆ( >′ cκ  and 
0)( <′ κO . Thus, a decline in trade barriers t implies a decrease in skill-intensity κ and an 
increase in outsourcing activities O, and therefore a shift from integrated to fragmented 
production in Home.11 This outcome is independent of the labour market regime. Second, if the 
low-skilled labour market is competitive, relative wages *ω  increase in equilibrium. Third, 
according to (10), if the low-skilled labour market is unionized so that LL <  in equilibrium, the 
level of outsourcing O is relatively higher than in a competitive labour market, ceteris paribus. 
According to (12), this has no consequence for skill-intensity κ and relative wages ω in the case 
of 0=τ . However, if 0>′τ , then a relatively higher volume of O implies a relatively higher 
value of κ and thus a lower value of ω. In sum, with a unionized low-skilled labour market we 
have two cases: (i) without O-costs (i.e., 0=τ ), skill-intensity κ and relative wages ω resulting 
under a unionized low-skilled labour market regime are the same as in competitive labour 
markets, but the level of outsourcing O is higher. In this case unions do not succeed in 
moderating the increase in ω following a decline in trade barriers. In other words, the whole 
                                                     
10 In the case of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the decline in trade 
barriers vis-à-vis Austria was accompanied by a decline in trade barriers vis-à-vis all other 
members of the European Union. The latter may imply an adjustment of Foreign’s factor prices, 
i.e., an increase in low-skilled wages Lw ˆ , if trade barriers decline. However, even if the decline in 
t goes hand in hand with a decline in trade barriers between Foreign and the RoW, our results 
remain valid as long as the opening up of Foreign is ”effective” from Home’s point of view, 
which is the case, if cˆ  declines. 
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effect of the opening up is absorbed by a decline in L, i.e., an increase in LH / , which induces 
trade unions to tolerate the high ω. (ii) If 0>′τ , unions succeed in moderating the rise in ω. 
Ceteris paribus, L declines less and a lower outsourcing volume O results. 
In the empirical analysis below, we assess the role of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade as well 
as of foreign wages for Austrian outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, we investigate the consequences of a change of outsourcing to the Eastern 
economies for high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour employment in Austrian manufacturing.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
We use a small panel of 20 Austrian NACE 2-digit industries over the period 1990-1998. In the 
Appendix, we provide details on the construction of variables and data sources. The empirical 
analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we assess the determinants of Austrian outsourcing to 
Eastern countries. From our theoretical model, we expect that the decline in trade costs (tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade) after the fall of the Iron Curtain has raised outsourcing of Austrian 
firms to the Eastern economies. Besides trade costs, wage costs in the Eastern economies should 
be relevant, according to our theoretical analysis. To control for all other industry-specific 
determinants such as persistent technological differences and all time-specific determinants such 
as the business cycle or the decline in information and telecomunication costs, we use a fixed 
industry and time effects estimator. Second, we try to identify the effect of outsourcing on the 
employment of high-skilled relative to low-skilled labour. Thereby, we control for other channels 
of influence like relative wages, exports, imports, and capital intensity. Again, we include fixed 
industry and time effects to guard against omitted variables in the respective dimensions. Since 
                                                                                                                                                                           
11 For a similar finding see Jones and Kierzowski (1990) and Egger and Falkinger (2001). See 
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both relative employment and relative wages are simultaneously determined, there is an inherent 
problem of endogenous wages, which motivates an instrumental variable approach. Additionally, 
our theoretical model illustrates the endogeneity of outsourcing, which has so far not been 
considered in the empirical literature. We use the mentioned determinants of outsourcing, the 
degree of trade union organization (ORG), the industry price-cost margin (PCM) and medium 
firm size (MSIZE) as instruments.12 We apply a traditional two-stage least squares and a three-
stage least squares fixed effects estimator. In the former, we once treat outsourcing as 
endogenous and once as exogenous to show that an exogenous treatment of outsourcing results in 
biased parameters. Thereby, we use the same instruments for both relative wages and endogenous 
outsourcing. The three-stage least squares estimator has two advantages: (i) it allows for different 
sets of instruments for relative wages and outsourcing, and (ii) it results in more efficient 
parameter estimates. Using the same set of instruments as the two-stage least squares model 
identifies the pure efficiency gain of three-stage least squares. The second approach of different 
sets of instruments for relative wages (ORG, PCM, MSIZE) and outsourcing (TB, NTBD, NTBI, 
ULCE) is closer to our theoretical model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
also Feenstra (1998) and Krugman (1995). 
12 Whereas the determinants of outsourcing (tariff barriers, TB, non-tariff barriers, NTBD and 
NTBI, and unit labour costs in Eastern Europe, ULCE) and ORG are motivated in our theoretical 
analysis, we include PCM and MSIZE following previous empirical research. For further details, 
see the data description in the Appendix. 
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3.1 Determinants of outsourcing 
Table 1 reports results of fixed effects panel regressions of outsourcing on the weighted average 
of Eastern unit labour costs (ULCE), trade barriers (TB), and the two non-tariff barriers to trade 
variables as introduced in the Appendix (NTBD, NTBI).13  
> Table 1 < 
Specification I assesses the determinants of outsourcing to the Eastern economies relative to 
gross production (OY), and Specification II of outsourcing to the Eastern economies relative to 
overall intermediate goods purchases (OI). The results broadly confirm our view that outsourcing 
to Eastern countries is low-cost seeking, reflected by a negative parameter of ULCE. The 
reduction in tariff barriers TB, as observed after the fall of the Iron Curtain, has indeed led to an 
increase in Austrian outsourcing to Eastern economies. The positive sign of the NTBD parameter 
squares with our theoretical prediction, but this variable has almost no variation in the time 
dimension. NTBI shows a negative but insignificant sign. The parameter estimate of NTBI 
captures the marginal impact of an increase in the frequency of NTBs on outsourcing. From a 
theoretical point of view, we would have expected a significant negative impact of NTBI. 
 
3.2 Employment effects of outsourcing 
The second step of our empirical analysis is concerned with the employment effects of 
outsourcing. We propose the following specification 
 RSit = β0+β1RWit+β2XYit+β3MYit+β4KYit+β5OUTit+µi+λt+εit, (13) 
where RS is the employment of high-skilled labour relative to low-skilled labour (H/L), RW is the 
relative wage rate ( LH ww / ), XY are exports relative to gross production (export openness), MY 
15 
are world imports minus the volume of outsourcing to Eastern countries relative to gross 
production, KY is the capital-output ratio (real stock of capital relative to gross production), OUT 
is outsourcing to the Eastern economies (i.e., OY, OI, respectively), and µi (λt) represents fixed 
industry (time) specific effects. As mentioned above, there is an econometric problem of 
endogeneity between relative employment (RS) and relative wages (RW) as well as between 
relative employment (RS) and outsourcing (OUT). Such endogeneity leads to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the ordinary least squares parameters. Therefore, we have to use 
instrumental variables (IV), to obtain consistent estimates. Table 2 reports the results of applying 
IV for relative wages (RW) as well as outsourcing (OUT) in Specifications 1 and 2, and for 
relative wages only (treating outsourcing as exogenous) in Specifications 3 and 4. Note that we 
again distinguish between OY (Specifications 1 and 3) and OI (Specifications 2 and 4). According 
to the normality tests, the database exhibits sound properties for the hypothesis tests. The 
reported Ramsey RESET tests confirm that there might be additional unexhausted information, 
which could be due to underlying non-linearities. We therefore should interpret the estimation 
results with care.  
> Table 2 < 
Outsourcing to Eastern countries (OY, OI) exerts a significant positive impact on the employment 
of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers. This is a robust result, which does not 
depend on whether we treat outsourcing as exogenous (Specifications 3 and 4) or not 
(Specifications 1 and 2). The (negative) impact of relative wages on relative employment turns 
out to be insignificant. This does not mean that unions are not important in the wage-setting 
process, rather, the importance of unions is reflected by their significant impact on relative 
wages. All other explanatory variables enter significantly. Export openness and import openness 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 See Görg (2000) for an assessment of the determinants of US inward processing trade with the 
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are included to control for trade effects, which raise the efficiency of production (Greenaway et 
al., 1999). We find that an increase in Austrian industry exports (XY) has an employment effect in 
favour of high-skilled workers. The opposite holds true for imports (MY), which exert a negative 
impact on relative employment. The latter is due to a displacement effect, since Austria is an 
importer of high-skilled labour intensive goods. This reduces the relative demand for domestic 
high-skilled employees. It is important to note that the effect of MY on relative labour 
employment is different from the effect of OUT (OY, OI). The main reason for this probably is 
that OUT only contains intermediate goods imports from low-skilled labour rich Eastern 
economies. In contrast, MY includes all imports minus outsourcing to Eastern countries, 
especially those from highly industrialized (Western European) countries. A higher capital 
intensity (KY) is associated with a lower ratio of high-skilled relative to low-skilled employment. 
At the Austrian industry level, we do not observe a high positive correlation between capital and 
high-skilled labour employment. This squares with evidence for the U.S. (see Berman et al., 
1994) and other countries and may be explained by the fact that a majority of the capital-
intensive industries in Austria comprises large former state-owned enterprises, which are 
specialized in the production of low-skill-intensive goods. According to the F-tests, both fixed 
industry effects and outlier dummies contribute relevant information. Interestingly, this is not the 
case for overall exogenous, non-neutral technical change (fixed time effects). 
Buse (1992) and Shea (1997) remark that the inclusion of irrelevant and overidentifying 
instruments increases the finite sample bias of the IV estimator. Therefore, in the IV two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) regressions only those instruments are used, which have a significant impact 
in the first stage regressions. These are the degree of union organization (ORG), the price-cost 
margin (PCM), median industry firm size (MSIZE), and the most favoured nation tariff rate (TB) 
                                                                                                                                                                           
EU. 
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in all specifications. In Specifications 1 and 2, relative wages (RW) and outsourcing (OY, OI) are 
instrumented with the same variables. We apply Shea’s (1997) partial 2pR  test in order to check 
for instrumental relevance.14 We find that instruments do have a relevant impact and that the 
instrumentation of outsourcing is of even greater relevance than that of relative wages. 
Additionally, we apply the Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test on instrument validity. This is a 
specification test for the correlation of the instruments with the error term in the second stage 
regression. In our case, the test statistics do not reject the hypothesis of proper specification and 
instrumentation in any of the specifications of Table 2. We may therefore conclude from our 
analysis that outsourcing should be treated as endogenous in the empirical setup. Ignoring the 
possible endogeneity would result in a downward bias of the estimated effect of outsourcing on 
relative employment. 
As is well known, the 2SLS estimator is consistent but only a limited information method. 
Therefore, this technique is less efficient than a systems estimator. In order to overcome this 
problem, one has to consider full information or systems methods of estimation (e.g., three-stage 
least squares, 3SLS, or full information maximum likelihood estimation, FIML). From an 
econometric point of view, systems estimation also enables us to overcome another problem. In 
the presence of two or more endogenous variables (which is the case in our example), 2SLS only 
allows for a single set of instruments for the whole set of endogenous variables. This might 
provide less theoretical support than a distinct identification and it artificially causes problems of 
irrelevance in the presence of multicollinearity between parts of the sets of instruments, 
especially, if the instruments are not perfectly exogenous (Shea, 1997).15 The latter results in a 
                                                     
14 Partial 2pR  measures the additional contribution of the instrument set for the explanation of 
each endogenous variable. 
15 Shea (1997, p. 348) notes for 2SLS that ”low relevance increases the inconsistency of IV 
estimates whenever instruments are not perfectly exogenous. Even when instruments are 
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finite sample bias of the estimator. We therefore estimate four specifications by 3SLS (see Table 
3). Two of them use the same set of identifying variables for both relative wages and outsourcing 
(Specifications A and B) and are explicitly in accordance with Specifications 1 and 2 in Table 2. 
The remaining two specifications (C and D) distinguish between the set of identifying 
assumptions for relative wages (degree of organization of trade unions, ORG; medium industry 
firm size, MSIZE; and price-cost margin, PCM) and for outsourcing (tariff barriers, TB; non-tariff 
barriers, NTBD and NTBI; and unit labour costs in Eastern economies, ULCE). 
> Table 3 < 
As expected, there is only a minor difference between Specification A (B) and Specification 1 
(2), which primarily shows up in lower standard errors and is due to the efficiency gain of 3SLS. 
Applying different sets of identifying assumptions for relative wages and outsourcing underpins 
the robustness of our results. The impact of outsourcing on relative employment is always 
significantly positive. Moreover, the effects are very close and a 1% increase in outsourcing to 
the Eastern economies leads to a change in relative employment of between 0.08% and 0.12%.16 
Over the last decade, we observe an increase in outsourcing to the Eastern economies of about 
11% and an increase in relative employment of about 4.5% p.a. Thus, our econometric results 
would lead us to the conclusion that outsourcing to the Eastern countries accounts for about a 
quarter of the change in relative employment in favour of high-skilled labour. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
perfectly exogenous, low relevance increases asymptotic standard errors and therefore reduces 
the power of hypothesis tests. Moreover, low relevance can cause the finite-sample distribution of 
IV estimates to depart considerably from the asymptotic normal distribution...”. The same, of 
course, holds true for 3SLS. 
16 Recall from the Appendix that OY is a composite of two effects, namely of a change in the 
share of Eastern countries in intermediate imports and a change in the share of intermediate 
goods in gross production. This measure might be superior for our purpose, particularly as 
compared to OI, which only reflects the change in the role of the Eastern countries in outsourcing 
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4. Concluding remarks 
The opening up of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union after the fall of the 
Iron Curtain has induced a political and economic (re)orientation of these countries towards the 
EU at rather rapid pace. Especially, intermediate goods trade between Western European and 
Eastern economies has considerably increased in this period. This motivates the question about 
the causes of increased outsourcing to the low-wage Eastern countries and its consequences for 
the unionized labour markets in (small) Western European economies.  
We present a model in which trade of a small country, Home, with Foreign (in our context to be 
associated with the Eastern economies) is impeded, while Home trades freely with the Rest of the 
World. We focus on a homogeneous industrialized good, which may be produced either 
nationally, using low-skilled and high-skilled labour at Home, or in a fragmented way by 
outsourcing across borders, using low-skilled labour abroad and only high-skilled labour at 
Home. Based on this framework, we investigate the impact of a decline in trade barriers on 
outsourcing of firms located in Home into low-skilled labour rich Foreign. In addition, we 
identify the effects of a stimulation of cross-border outsourcing on Home’s labour markets. The 
main findings are the following. First, the volume of outsourcing increases if trade barriers 
decline. Second, if Home’s labour markets are competitive, an increase in outsourcing raises 
relative wages in favour of high-skilled labour, but it has no impact on the employment of high-
skilled relative to low-skilled labour. Second, if the low-skilled labour market is unionized, we 
find that a stimulation of outsourcing raises both relative wages and relative employment of high-
skilled labour in Home.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
relative to others (reflected by a lower coefficient of outsourcing in Specifications B and D as 
compared to A and C). 
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In the empirical application, we focus on outsourcing by Austrian manufacturing industries and 
find that our theoretical predictions are widely in accordance with the empirical results. 
Outsourcing to Eastern countries is low-wage seeking. Moreover, shrinking trade barriers are an 
important stimulus of outsourcing to the Central and Eastern European countries and the former 
Soviet Union. Regarding the labour market effects in Austria, we estimate the impact of 
outsourcing on relative employment, controlling for other non-neutral influences. We find that a 
1% increase in outsourcing to the Eastern countries relative to gross production induces a shift in 
relative employment by about 0.1% in favour of high-skilled labour. Outsourcing to the Eastern 
economies accounts for about one quarter of the change in relative employment in favour of high-
skilled labour in the last decade. This phenomenon could prove to be similar for some of the 
other small Western European countries and it is likely to become even more pronounced, when 
(some of) the Eastern economies join the European Union. 
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Appendix: Data description 
A.1 Trade data 
Data on final and intermediate goods exports and imports are from Statistics Austria. Contrary to 
Feenstra and Hanson, who used a wide measure of outsourcing including ”all imported 
intermediate or final goods that are used of, or sold under the brandname of, an American firm” 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, p. 107), we apply a narrow one, including only intermediate goods 
imported from Eastern countries, which are produced by industry i firms abroad and used by 
firms of the same industry classification in Austria. 
Since data on cross-border outsourcing are not directly available, we construct a measure for the 
volume of outsourcing to Eastern countries in the following way 
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The first term (A) comprises the total volume of national and international outsourcing of 
industry i, i.e., intermediate goods purchases of industry i firms from domestic and foreign 
suppliers of the same industry classification i at time t. To obtain the volume of outsourcing to 
Eastern countries A is weighted by B·C. Term B represents overall intermediate and final goods 
imports of industry i relative to gross production of industry i, i.e., import openness of industry i. 
Term C measures the share of imports from Eastern countries in overall imports. (A·B) for 1990 
is reported in Austrian Input-Output statistics. For 1995 only A and for 2000 a preliminary 
estimate of (A·B) are available. We collect the remaining information (B, C) at an annual basis 
from trade and industry statistics over the period 1990-1998 and interpolate A for the missing 
years. 
In the econometric analysis below, we use two specifications for outsourcing to Eastern 
economies. First, the volume of cross-border outsourcing of sector i (Oit) relative to gross 
production of industry i, referred to as OY, and, second, the volume of cross-border outsourcing 
of sector i (Oit) relative to overall intermediate goods imports of sector i, referred to as OI.17 A 
change in OY comprises two effects: (i) the change of overall national and international 
outsourcing relative to gross production and (ii) the change in the share of intermediate goods 
                                                     
17 Overall intermediate goods imports of sector i are measured by 
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, where ittesintermedia  are all national and international 
intermediate goods purchases of firms in industry classification i. 
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imports from the Eastern countries in total intermediate goods imports.18 According to (14), we 
always concentrate on intermediate goods purchases by industry i firms from suppliers of the 
same industry classification i abroad. In contrast, OI only comprises (ii), i.e., the share of Eastern 
countries in overall intermediate goods imports. 
Trade barriers (the applied most-favoured-nation tariff rate, TB, and the frequency ratios of non-
tariff barriers, NTB) are from OECD and UNCTAD statistics. Data again were interpolated and 
reclassified to the NACE 2-digit level. NTB tables report zero frequency for a few industries 
(years), and natural numbers otherwise. Therefore, we must not simply take logs. Rather, we 
construct a dummy variable (NTBD), indicating whether NTBs are applied (NTBD=1) or not 
(NTBD=0). We construct a variable NTBI, which takes the log of NTB, if NTBD=1, i.e., if non-
tariff barriers are applied. Otherwise, we set NTBI at zero. The parameter of NTBI can only be 
interpreted together with NTBD. All trade barrier variables (TB, NTBD, NTBI) exhibit variation in 
both the industry and time dimensions. 
 
A.2 Skill and union data 
We collect information regarding skills (employment and wages) from the Austrian ”Lohn – und 
Gehaltsstatistik” provided by the Austrian Chamber of Commerce, which is available for industry 
categories similar to NACE. These statistics classify employees according to their utilization and 
not according to their education or training. We define the sum of workers with jobs requiring a 
high/special qualification level as high-skilled workers. The remaining employees are classified 
as low-skilled. 
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Data on union membership were provided by various sections of the Austrian Trade Union 
Confederation, which is a centrally managed organization. These sections cover either one or 
more industries and bargain over wages for the respective groups of workers. We measure the 
degree of organization of an industry by the variable 
t
it
itORG rateon unionizati
rateon unionizati
= , (15) 
i.e., by the degree of unionization of industry i relative to the average industry in each year t. 
ORG varies over 11 groups of industries due to the organization of the Austrian Trade Union 
Federation. 
 
A.3 Remaining variables 
Median firm size (MSIZE) and price-cost margins (PCM) are additional variables, which may be 
relevant for the power of employees in wage bargaining. Median firm size is available from the 
monthly WIFO investment survey of Austrian manufacturing firms (NACE 2-digit). The price-
cost margin variable is measured as the share of value added minus wage costs in gross 
production. Information on gross production, value added, nominal capital stocks, and capital 
deflators (all NACE 2-digit) is provided by Statistics Austria. The percentage of hours of capital 
stock in use is also reported in the WIFO investment survey.  
Finally, unit labour costs of seven Eastern economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia) at the industry level are derived from employment, 
wage, and gross production data (including production indices), which were provided by the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW). These data are reported in ISIC 
classification and in own currency. We use 1993 as the base year, and convert the series 
                                                                                                                                                                           
industry classification i. 
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according to the fixed exchange rate (1993) and aggregate them using industry-specific real gross 
production of the respective Eastern country as the weight. We apply the resulting variable as an 
approximate measure of unit labour costs for the Eastern countries as a whole (ULCE), including 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
Table 1 The determinants of Austrian outsourcing into Eastern economies (1990-1998)
Dependent variable β Std. error β Std. error
  Unit labor costs in Eastern countries (ULCE) -0.89 0.313 **) -0.83 0.294 **)
  Tariff barriers (TB) -0.43 0.124 **) -0.41 0.122 **)
  Non-tariff barriers dummy (NTBD) 0.60 0.160 **) 0.56 0.158 **)
  Non-tariff barriers interaction (NTBI) -0.01 0.009 -0.01 0.009
  Constant -6.70 0.598 **) -6.03 0.567 **)
Statistics (N=20; T=9) p-value p-value
Observations 180 180
Adj. R2 0.89 0.89
Time effects: F (8, 148)‡) 2.96 0.004 **) 3.12 0.003 **)
Industry effects: F (19, 148)‡) 66.92 0.000 **) 62.09 0.000 **)
Specification I§) Specification II†)
Notes: All variables are in logs. Parameter estimates for fixed time and industry effects are not reported in order to save
space. Only heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported. - §) Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured in
% of gross production. - †) Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured in % of intermediate inputs. - ‡) Degrees of
freedom in parentheses.  - **) significant at 5%, *) significant at 10%.
Table 2 Skill-specific relative employment and outsourcing in Austria 1990-1998 (two-stage least squares)
Dependent variable is log of high-skilled relative to low-skilled employment
Dependent Variable β Std. error β Std. error β Std. error β Std. error
  Outsourcing (OY) 0.10 0.040 **) - - 0.04 0.018 **) - -
  Outsourcing (OI) - - 0.08 0.031 **) - - 0.02 0.209
  Relative wage rate (RW) -0.93 1.056 -0.07 0.850 -0.79 0.990 -1.36 1.232
  Export openness (XY) 0.23 0.074 **) 0.28 0.066 **) 0.17 0.060 **) 0.20 0.070 **)
  Import openness (MY) -0.25 0.014 **) -0.36 0.069 **) -0.22 0.073 **) -0.25 0.086 **)
  Capital output ratio (KY) -0.24 0.119 **) -0.22 0.096 **) -0.15 0.097 -0.07 0.115
  Constant 2.20 0.839 **) 1.49 0.717 **) 1.44 0.625 **) 1.34 0.755 *)
Statistics (N=20; T=9) p-value p-value p-value p-value
Observations 179 179 179 179
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Time effects: F (8, 146) 0.98 0.457 0.89 0.526 1.46 0.178 1.31 0.245
Industry effects: F (19, 146) 389.19 0.000 **) 464.45 0.000 **) 440.83 0.000 **) 311.49 0.000 **)
Outlier effects: F(3, 143) 5.98 0.001 **) - - 6.07 0.001 **) - -
Normal distribution I: adj. χ2 ||) 1.84 0.398 4.64 0.098 *) 1.84 0.398 4.64 0.098 *)
Normal distribution II #) 1.01 0.155 0.43 0.332 1.01 0.155 0.43 0.332
Endogeneity (OUT)♣) 2.50 0.126 6.82 0.009 **) - - - -
Instrument relevance: R2p (RWAGE)
ϒ) 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.19
Instrument relevance: R2p (OUT)
ϒ) 0.50 0.57 - - - -
Overidentification χ2(m) ♦) 2.31 0.315 1.60 0.450 5.74 0.125 1.60 0.450
RESET:  F(3, 144) ₣) 7.17 0.000 **) 6.69 0.000 **) 7.17 0.000 **) 6.69 0.000 **)
Specification 1§) ‡) Specification 2†)  ‡) Specification 3§) ¶) Specification 4†) ¶)
Notes: All variables are in logs. Parameter estimates for fixed time and industry effects, as well as for outlier dummies, are not reported in order to save space. - §) Outsourcing
to Eastern countries measured in % of gross production. - †) Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured in % of intermediate inputs. - ‡) Relative wages and outsourcing are
instrumented according to the degree of trade union organisation (ORG), price cost margin (PCM), median firm size (MSIZE), trade barriers (TB), non-tariff barrier dummy
(NTBD), and non-tariff barrier interaction term (NTBI). - ¶) Only relative wages are instrumented according to the degree of trade union organisation (ORG), price cost margin
(PCM), median firm size (MSIZE), and tariff barriers to trade (TB). - ||) Combined Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality, Royston (1991). - #) Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal
data (Royston 1991); asymptotically following a normal distribution. - ♣) Hausman test on the endogeneity of outsourcing, Hausman (1978), Greene (1997). - ϒ) Partial R2 
diagnostics testing for instrumental relevance, Shea (1997). - ♦) Testing the validity of instruments based on overidentifyingrestrictions, under the null being distributed as χ
(number of overidentifying restrictions, m), Davidson & MacKinnon (1993, p. 236). - ₣) Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of the dependent. - **)
significant at 5%; *) significant at 10%.
Table 3 Three-stage least squares systems estimation results
Dependent variable is log of high-skilled relative to low-skilled employment
Dependent Variable5) β Std. error β Std. error β Std. error β Std. error
  Outsourcing (OY) 0.10 0.036 **) - - 0.12 0.026 **) - -
  Outsourcing (OI) - - 0.08 0.025 **) - - 0.08 0.027 **)
  Relative wage rate (RW) -0.93 0.944 0.06 0.731 -0.61 0.520 -0.21 0.612
  Export openness (XY) 0.23 0.066 **) 0.28 0.058 **) 0.26 0.054 **) 0.29 0.058 **)
  Import openness (MY) -0.25 0.073 **) -0.37 0.062 **) -0.33 0.057 **) -0.36 0.060 **)
  Capital output ratio (KY) -0.24 0.106 **) -0.22 0.086 **) -0.35 0.081 **) -0.22 0.084 **)
  Constant 2.20 0.750 **) 1.47 0.614 **) 1.90 0.562 **) 1.59 0.605 **)
Statistics (N=20; T=9; 3 Equations) p-value p-value p-value p-value
Observations 179 179 179 179
R2 Relative employment||) 0.986 0.988 0.989 0.987
R2 Relative wages||) 0.942 0.943 0.942 0.941
R2 Outsourcing||) 0.935 0.942 0.947 0.940
Time effects: χ2(24) 75.79 0.000 **) 80.99 0.000 **) 86.57 0.000 **) 74.22 0.000 **)
Industry effects: χ2(57) 13721.83 0.000 **) 14041.82 0.000 **) 17723.39 0.000 **) 15300.01 0.000 **)
Outlier effects: χ2(9) 32.00 0.000 **) - - 48.04 0.000 **) - -
Specification A§) ‡) Specification B†) ‡) Specification C§) ¶) Specification D†) ¶)
Notes: All variables are in logs. Parameter estimates for fixed time and industry effects, as well as for outlier dummies, are not reported in order to save space. - §)
Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured in % of gross production. - †) Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured in % of intermediate inputs. - ‡) Relative wages
and outsourcing in Specification A (Specification B) are instrumented as in Specification 1 (Specification 2), Table 2. - ¶) Relative wages are instrumented according to
the degree of trade union organisation (ORG), price cost margin (PCM), and medium industry firm size (MSIZE); outsourcing is instrumented by trade barriers (TB),
non-tariff barrier dummy (NTBD), non-tariff barrier interaction term (NTBI), and unit labor costs in Eastern countries (ULCE). - ||) R2 for the respective equation. - **)
significant at 5%.
